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Some military expeditions require the combined skills and resources of two or more armed services to achieve an objective. Amphibious operations use armies to seize overseas objectives and the navy to get them there. In the past, the commanding general and admiral shared command, “each supreme in his own sphere.” Kings and governments expected them to work together to obtain victory, though cooperation could not be guaranteed.

Joint operations challenged leaders because generals and admirals did not understand their partner’s capabilities and limitations. In his book, The Influence of Seapower Upon History: 1660-1783, Alfred Thayer Mahan characterized such misunderstandings.

“The army thought that the navy might have beaten down stone ramparts ten feet thick; and the navy wondered why the army had not walked up the same ramparts, which were thirty feet perpendicular.”

Failed Joint Operations - Santiago de Cuba

In my book, Disaster on the Spanish Main, I discuss the inept command structure of the British attempt to capture Santiago de Cuba in 1741. A massive British expeditionary force had just returned to Jamaica from their failed siege of Cartagena. The two commanders Vice Adm. Edward Vernon and Maj. Gen. Thomas Wentworth then set their sights on Santiago. Wentworth wanted the navy to blast its way past Castillo San Pedro de la Rocha and land his troops inside the harbor. Vernon refused to risk his ships in the narrow channel under the castillo’s guns.

Without consulting the army, Vernon landed the troops at Guantanamo Bay, fifty miles east of Santiago. He expected the army to march across enemy territory, over forest trails with no draft animals then assault a castle. Once the general saw the terrain and the distance to be marched, he refused to budge. Instead of working through their differences, both commanders became obstinate and accused the other of sabotaging the operation. After the mission was abandoned some of the army officers sent a proposal to London. They begged that in future amphibious operations, “the chief command of the whole should be lodg’d in a single person.”

Tragic Joint Operations - Operation Cobra

In World War II, General Eisenhower managed to get unified command of the three combatant arms for the Normandy landings. Eisenhower, a big proponent of joint operations, once said, “When you put sea, ground and air power together, the result you get is not the sum of their separate powers. You multiply their powers, rather than add.” Under a single commander, Allied forces worked together more effectively but still had issues sorting out combined missions.

Target Box for Operation Cobra

To achieve a breakout in Normandy Lt. Gen. Omar Bradley planned to bomb part of the German defensive front. He wanted to drive into a void created by heavy bombing. Bradley plotted a “target box” just beyond a highway to be saturated by British and American strategic bombers.

During a planning session the general and air staffs disagreed about the direction of the air attack. Bradley wanted a parallel approach to the target box, so the bombers would not fly over his troops. The air commanders opposed the parallel approach because it jammed the planes into a narrow corridor. They argued for a perpendicular flight path that posed less risk for their crews. The meeting broke up without a clear understanding of how the bombers would make their runs. Without consulting Bradley, the air commanders later decided to attack the target box at a right angle to the front.

Operation Cobra achieved mixed results. The strategic bombers inflicted serious destruction, though not total, on the German defense. The benefit of the carpet bombing got offset by numerous short bomb loads dropped on friendly troops. The units making the attack suffered confusion and the loss of over 100 killed and nearly 500 wounded. Bradley’s penetration succeeded in breaking through but he swore off using strategic bombers ever again.

Successful Joint Operations - Fort Fisher

There have been notable examples of successful joint operations. During the Civil War the Confederates fortified the point of land at the entrance to the Cape Fear River. This fortification, Fort Fisher, had kept the vital port of Wilmington open to blockade runners. After an abortive attempt on Fort Fisher in December 1864, the Union organized a second attack in January.

Rear Adm. David Porter and Maj. Gen. Alfred Terry coordinated an amphibious landing north of the fort. The navy provided massive fire support against Confederate positions while Union troops came ashore on January 13. The ships shifted their fire to the fort as the army cut off the peninsula and made its approach. After a continual bombardment the army and a supporting force of marines assaulted the fort’s northern face. The troops penetrated the fort while communicating their progress with the navy. The ships kept shifting their fire ahead of the advance until the Confederates surrendered. Careful planning and communication produced a decisive Union victory against a formidable defensive position.

Naval Bombardment of Fort Fisher

Lessons

In sum, joint operations depend on each armed service understanding the resources, tactics and shortcomings of the others. The operational plan demands input from each service to involve joint assets to their fullest capability. A single unified commander should settle disputes and disagreements between services. During execution, all services must overcome systems incompatibilities to inter-communicate and keep the battle properly coordinated. When joint planning, communication and control come together the results can achieve the multiplicative effect Eisenhower described.

Historians have spilled more ink about the Battle of Gettysburg than any other conflict in human history. Still, people often lose sight of the critical role artillery fire planning played in the attack against Cemetery Ridge.

Confederate Fire Support Plan

When General Lee decided to attack Cemetery Ridge on July 3, he fashioned a plan

Brig. Gen. Wm Pendleton
Confederate Artillery Chief, Brig. Gen. Wm Pendleton

that depended on a massed artillery preparation. He intended to have the artillery fire pave the way for Pickett’s, Pettigrew’s and Trimble’s infantry divisions. Yet, Lee’s plan fell short of its potential. Lee's Army had not developed the degree of centralized fire planning necessary to achieve his purpose. The army’s chief of artillery, Brigadier General William Pendleton, viewed his role as a logistics planner, not as a tactician. He only contributed to the fire support plan by tasking the batteries in Hill's and Ewell's Corps that faced the objective to join the bombardment. Responsibility for directing the artillery fire against Cemetery Ridge devolved upon Colonel Edward Porter Alexander who commanded the I Corps (Longstreet's) artillery reserve battalion. Alexander amassed enough guns to pound Cemetery Ridge. Eighty-four guns from I Corps, seventy-two guns from III Corps and another sixteen from II Corps would fire the preparation.

Col. Edward P. Alexander
I Corps Artillery Commander Col E. P. Alexander

The batteries deployed along Seminary Ridge that ran parallel to the objective on Cemetery Ridge. The guns had a broad sweep of the Union lines but the limited depth of the objective presented a challenge. The gunners needed precise range estimates and accurately timed fuses to strike their targets. Lee counted on the 172 guns to soften up the Union infantry and take out their supporting artillery. However, the Confederate fire support had one inescapable limitation. Lee had planned a frontal attack. The Confederate infantry had to pass through their own artillery batteries on the way to the objective. That meant the artillery could not suppress the Union guns during the infantry approach march and final assault.

Missed Opportunity

The Confederate fire support plan had another, needless, flaw. Neither Lee nor

Attack Against Cemetery Ridge
Confederate Attack Against Cemetery Ridge

Pendleton planned artillery fire to encompass the whole battlefield. More than 40 guns belonging to Ewell's II Corps stayed idle during the attack. Pendleton left them out of the battle because II Corps was not involved in the attack. This decision violated an important artillery precept to maximize the use of available fire support assets.

To make matters worse, the II Corps guns had the best position for suppressing the defenders on Cemetery Ridge. The Union defense resembled a fish-hook, anchored on Round Top in the south and Cemetery Hill in the north. The long dimension of the front ran north-south along Cemetery Ridge. The south-facing II Corps guns had a chance to rain devastating enfilade fire down the length of the objective. The gunners only had to align their guns with the ridge and not worry about the range. Their shells would land somewhere along the defensive front. Furthermore, these guns could keep firing throughout the infantry attack until the final push masked their fire.

Union Fire Support

MG Henry Hunt
Union Artillery Chief, Maj. Gen. Henry Hunt

In contrast, the Union chief of artillery, Major General Henry Hunt, supervised all the army’s guns. He even oversaw the allocation, positioning and targeting of the guns under the direct control of the corps commanders. Hunt arrayed his batteries from Little Round Top in the south to Cemetery Hill farther north. From these positions, Union artillery covered the valley separating the two armies with deadly interlocking fire. Hunt also trained his battery commanders to fire at a deliberate rate to conserve ammunition and preserve accuracy.

Artillery Battle

The effectiveness of the artillery fire on July 3, 1863 reflected the tactical expertise of the two artillery chiefs. The Confederates unleashed a concentrated and sustained bombardment but the massive preparation failed to blast a hole in the Union line. The gunners had difficulty setting the proper range on their guns. As a result, the shells mostly overshot the objective.

At first, the Union batteries returned fire, leading to an indecisive artillery duel. Union General Hunt intervened to stop the duel. He ordered his batteries to cease fire. He knew the upcoming infantry attack represented a greater threat and a more lucrative target for the Union’s remaining rounds. Across the battlefield, Colonel Alexander halted the Confederate preparation once ammunition ran low. This left the Confederate infantry to break the Union line on their own. A key piece of Lee’s battle plan had fallen short.

Artillery Fire at Gettysburg
Union Battery in Action

When the Confederate infantry divisions approached Cemetery Ridge, the Union guns inflicted appalling casualties with canister shot against the exposed infantry. Rather than stay put, one aggressive Union battery surged forward and flanked the Confederate formation. Their guns then shattered the attacking infantry with deadly enfilade fire. As the attack reached its decisive stage, the Union guns punished the Confederates with heavy losses.

To read a more detailed description of the assault on Cemetery Ridge, I invite you to read my previous publication, More Terrible Than Victory,

Conclusion

In sum, ineffective Confederate artillery fire planning squandered a chance to deliver a damaging blow to the Union position on Cemetery Ridge. This oversight allowed well-planned and well-managed Union artillery fire to cripple the assault.

Military units must fight with a single will to triumph on the battlefield. The individual responsible for imbuing that will into the hearts of the soldiers is the commander. In combat, a strong-willed leader is one who infuses his subordinate commanders and troops with an indomitable fighting spirit.

Brigade Commander

Portrait of William MacRae
General William MacRae

During research for my Civil War book, More Terrible Than Victory, I ran across a leader who stood out for his success in boosting the combat effectiveness of his unit. Confederate Brigadier General William MacRae took command of a North Carolina brigade in late June 1864. The Tar Heel brigade had suffered terrible losses in the Virginia Overland Campaign over the previous two months. In his first act as brigade commander MacRae booted his men out of the wagons they were supposed to guard on an easy resupply mission. His strict orders put the troops on notice that discipline under the new general would be a lot tighter.

The thirty-year old general took steps to uplift esprit de corps within his brigade. Especially noteworthy, he formed an elite team of skirmishers from battle-proven troops of every regiment. “MacRae’s Sharpshooters” carried repeating rifles and held regular marksmanship practice. Men competed for the distinction of joining the exclusive sharpshooter outfit. Throughout the rest of the Petersburg Campaign they led the way for the brigade, often overcoming their foes by themselves.

Reams Station

Battle of Reams Station
MacRae's Brigade Assaults at Reams Station

General MacRae proved his tactical skills two months later at the Battle of Reams Station. His brigade drew a hard luck mission to attack across open ground to dislodge part of the Union II Corps from an entrenched position. The Union troops had already driven off two earlier attacks. Scouting the terrain MacRae realized that the only chance for success was to break the Union position with a spirited bayonet charge, relying on a bold, rapid charge to overwhelm the defenders’ will. MacRae timed his attack perfectly. He held his brigade back until the adjacent units advanced close to the Union position then unleashed his men. As a result, the fierce assault demoralized the Union defenders and collapsed their position.

Burgess Mill

MacRae’s Brigade further burnished its reputation within the Army of Northern Virginia at other engagements around Petersburg. While the morale of many Confederate units eroded under the pressure of Grant’s siege, the Tar Heels showed rejuvenated spirit at Jones Farm and Burgess Mill. At the latter battle, MacRae’s Brigade nearly routed an entire Union Corps before getting counterattacked from three different directions. Showing his usual aggressiveness and skill, MacRae led his men out of the trap. He refused to abandon the field even though his exposed troops were heavily out-numbered. The Union troops withdrew that night. The battered Tar Heel brigade prevailed through sheer force of will.

Combat Leadership

The short general with the high-pitched voice turned his worn-out brigade into one of the best fighting forces within Lee’s Army. His tactical skill, discipline, and determination showed forth in the fighting prowess of his men from general to private. In conclusion, William MacRae exemplified the value of leadership in generating combat effectiveness.