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When I was a battalion commander, I confessed a military truth to my troops. “I can’t win a battle. I carry a .45 cal. pistol—no way can I defeat an enemy force. It takes riflemen, tank crews, squad leaders, sometimes junior officers, to win a battle…But I can sure lose one.” I finished with a commitment. “If you follow orders and fight with vigor, I’ll do my part to follow sound tactical principles that will give you the chance to win.”

The relationship between troops and their commander depends on this implicit bond. When either party falls down on their promise, the results can be terrible.

When Troops Fail

Military history provides a few examples of troops failing to deliver victory despite

the clever and bold plans of their generals. General Grant caught Lee off-guard during the Overland Campaign of 1864.

Assault at Petersburg
Army of Potomac assaults Petersburg

He sent a large force south of the James River to attack a thin Confederate defensive line around Petersburg while Lee guarded the front north of the river. The Union troops, already depleted by heavy casualties at the Wilderness, Spotsylvania and Cold Harbor, mounted only a half-hearted assault against a small but determined Confederate force. Grant’s army squandered this opportunity to break the Confederate defense and had to spend another nine months investing Petersburg. At Kips Bay, New York in 1776, Washington had pre-positioned a patriot force where the British made an amphibious landing. The patriots barely fired a shot in the battle. Washington became apoplectic when his troops panicked and fled before the small British landing party.

Even in these situations, commanders do not escape responsibility for the poor performance of their men. In the above examples, Grant had allowed the fighting spirit of his command to dull through heavy losses and lack of confidence. Washington should not have expected the ill-trained and inexperienced militia unit to stand firm against a bayonet charge from British regulars.

When Generals Fail

The sadder and more common tragedy arises when brave, capable soldiers die needlessly through the errors and inattention of their commanders.

General Gerow
General Gerow

The 1944 fight on the Schnee Eifel portion of the Siegfried Line, discussed in my book Battle Hardened, demonstrates the effect of poor decision-making and faulty terrain analysis. The V Corps Commander, MG Leonard Gerow, channeled the 4th Infantry Division into a forlorn attack on the wet, wooded ridge that lacked roads to support a major advance. The division’s attack plan forced the 12th Infantry Regiment to fight along the narrow crest of the Schnee Eifel, a plan similar to climbing a fence by crawling over it lengthwise. The American infantrymen outfought the slapped-together German troops, from one pillbox to the next, in a series of localized shootouts. The narrow crest road, often interdicted by German artillery, constricted the Americans’ maneuver and supply operations. Instead of breaking through, the attack crawled, even though the GIs killed and captured the defenders they faced.

Poor Tactics

History provides several egregious examples of generals ignoring basic tactics.

In 1758, General James Abercrombie brought an overwhelming force against the French at Fort Carillon, now known as Ticonderoga. Abercrombie disregarded a commanding hill that he could have used to pummel the French flank with artillery. Instead, he left his guns in the rear and threw his infantry into a frontal attack against hasty French entrenchments.

Attack on Fort Carillon
British Troops Attack Fort Carillon

The French infantry swept the ground with musket fire from behind breastworks that could have been blown to pieces by artillery. The British, with the help of some colonial troops, pressed the attack but withered under French musket fire. When his first attack failed, Abercrombie ordered another, unsupported, frontal attack with the same result. The British suffered 2,500 casualties in the futile assaults. Abercrombie still had a huge advantage in strength but decided to withdraw. The rapid retreat stunned the French who could hardly believe they so easily defeated the massive British force.

Another British general, Thomas Wentworth, failed as miserably. He commanded a British and colonial American expedition that tried to capture Cartagena in 1741.

Cartagena Castle
Castle Walls at Cartagena

The British had to seize a stone castle that dominated the Caribbean town. Rather than batter down the fortress walls with artillery, Wentworth ordered several thousand infantrymen to assault the castle. The redcoats approached the fort only to discover that their ladders could not reach the top of the parapets. With no breach in the walls and no way to climb them, the attacking force stood helpless beneath the castle. Exposed to enemy fire, they suffered heavy losses. The attack accomplished nothing, except waste lives.

Conclusion

These examples illustrate the point I originally made. The troops are the ones who kill the enemy and break his will in battle. As stated in the U.S. Army’s leadership manual, “What they ask in return is competent leadership.” The general’s role is to give the soldiers the chance to achieve victory. He does that by giving them the resources they need and employing them in a tactically sound manner. Failing that, victory becomes unobtainable.

Shortly after the Normandy landings, the German Army noticed something about the American Army’s fighting habits. “There was usually a lull in the fighting during the nights.” The Americans seldom continued a fight after the sun went down. A reading of American unit journals confirm that little action occurred during the hours of darkness. Only the Germans used the dark to launch attacks.

The Advantages of Night Operations

The Germans made excellent use of nighttime for “tactical regroupings, unit transfers, the forward movement of replacements and supplies…tactical movements in preparation for an attack…movement into defensive positions…disengagement, and retreat.” With Allied planes roaming the skies, the Germans risked exposure to air attack if they moved at all during the day. Pressed during the day by American infantry and Allied air, the Germans felt a huge sense of relief to have nighttime to themselves. While the Americans slept the Germans used the night to recover and reset their defense.

The Americans sacrificed several tactical advantages by restricting offensive operations to daytime. First, the added concealment of night could’ve saved lives when American riflemen had to attack over open farmland. Second, darkness shortened the effective range of defensive weapons making it easier to close with the enemy. Third, the infantry missed the chance to infiltrate German positions under the cover of dark. When German resources dwindled too far to put together a solid defense, they began defending a line of forward isolated outposts backed by reserves. Their combat outposts often blunted American attacks and cost the Americans a lot of casualties. The American infantry could've compromised this strategy by slipping between the outposts at night.

Why Didn’t the Americans Attack at Night?

General Blumentritt
General der Infantrie Gunther Blumentritt

The natural difficulty of controlling movement in the hours of darkness explains some of the reluctance. A German general, Gunther Blumentritt, once noted, “Night is no man’s friend.” Given the inexperience of the leaders, American units may have considered a night attack too risky. Fatigue also played a part. After planning and supervising attacks during the day, commanders and staffs did not have the energy to extend operations into the night. Fatigue does not justify losing lives. If commanders thought they could attack successfully at night, they would've exploited that tactic. Why did they lack confidence in their ability to attack at night? I have an explanation for why American units avoided night attacks.

Tactical Doctrine

The Army’s field manuals from the early 1940s discussed night attacks but always from the view that such an operation was employed under exceptional circumstances. Manuals at company, battalion and regiment levels emphasized the difficulties of night operations but seldom mentioned the potential benefits. Doctrine imposed extra reconnaissance and movement control measures. Units required special training and rehearsals before any night attack could be considered. Given the daily grind of offensive operations in Normandy, commanders had no opportunity to plan and prepare such complex operations. As a result, the American Army slogged away, day-after-day, against German defenses in the light of day.

I had my introduction to the Army’s tactical doctrine when I served as a lieutenant at Fort Hood. I put together a field training event on the night attack. After pulling out my rifle company field manual (FM 7-10), I read through all the requirements for a successful night attack. I programmed each step in the tactical exercise. The company performed daylight and evening recons of the objective. Men stayed behind to maintain observation on the objective. The platoons posted guides to

Field Exercise
Author (2nd from R) Fort Hood 1973

help with night navigation and rehearsed for an assault in the dark. All this preparation took hours. A relatively simple night movement bogged down when the platoons wasted time just linking up with the right guides. Even then the guides themselves had trouble navigating to the correct positions for the final assault. The attack dragged for more hours.

Conclusion

At the end of the training exercise, I got together with the other lieutenants to discuss the operation. All of us agreed that the whole attack grossly violated the KISS formula (Keep It Simple Stupid). We felt that a single recon of the objective followed by careful map reading and a little compass work would’ve gotten us to the objective a lot sooner. The conclusion—the Army’s tactical doctrine was way too complex and difficult to execute.

In truth, tactics for a night attack should mirror those for a daylight attack. Had the troops of 1944 been taught and trained that way, they might’ve seized the advantages of night operations and put relentless pressure on the German defenders.