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Some military expeditions require the combined skills and resources of two or more armed services to achieve an objective. Amphibious operations use armies to seize overseas objectives and the navy to get them there. In the past, the commanding general and admiral shared command, “each supreme in his own sphere.” Kings and governments expected them to work together to obtain victory, though cooperation could not be guaranteed.

Joint operations challenged leaders because generals and admirals did not understand their partner’s capabilities and limitations. In his book, The Influence of Seapower Upon History: 1660-1783, Alfred Thayer Mahan characterized such misunderstandings.

“The army thought that the navy might have beaten down stone ramparts ten feet thick; and the navy wondered why the army had not walked up the same ramparts, which were thirty feet perpendicular.”

Failed Joint Operations - Santiago de Cuba

In my book, Disaster on the Spanish Main, I discuss the inept command structure of the British attempt to capture Santiago de Cuba in 1741. A massive British expeditionary force had just returned to Jamaica from their failed siege of Cartagena. The two commanders Vice Adm. Edward Vernon and Maj. Gen. Thomas Wentworth then set their sights on Santiago. Wentworth wanted the navy to blast its way past Castillo San Pedro de la Rocha and land his troops inside the harbor. Vernon refused to risk his ships in the narrow channel under the castillo’s guns.

Without consulting the army, Vernon landed the troops at Guantanamo Bay, fifty miles east of Santiago. He expected the army to march across enemy territory, over forest trails with no draft animals then assault a castle. Once the general saw the terrain and the distance to be marched, he refused to budge. Instead of working through their differences, both commanders became obstinate and accused the other of sabotaging the operation. After the mission was abandoned some of the army officers sent a proposal to London. They begged that in future amphibious operations, “the chief command of the whole should be lodg’d in a single person.”

Tragic Joint Operations - Operation Cobra

In World War II, General Eisenhower managed to get unified command of the three combatant arms for the Normandy landings. Eisenhower, a big proponent of joint operations, once said, “When you put sea, ground and air power together, the result you get is not the sum of their separate powers. You multiply their powers, rather than add.” Under a single commander, Allied forces worked together more effectively but still had issues sorting out combined missions.

Target Box for Operation Cobra

To achieve a breakout in Normandy Lt. Gen. Omar Bradley planned to bomb part of the German defensive front. He wanted to drive into a void created by heavy bombing. Bradley plotted a “target box” just beyond a highway to be saturated by British and American strategic bombers.

During a planning session the general and air staffs disagreed about the direction of the air attack. Bradley wanted a parallel approach to the target box, so the bombers would not fly over his troops. The air commanders opposed the parallel approach because it jammed the planes into a narrow corridor. They argued for a perpendicular flight path that posed less risk for their crews. The meeting broke up without a clear understanding of how the bombers would make their runs. Without consulting Bradley, the air commanders later decided to attack the target box at a right angle to the front.

Operation Cobra achieved mixed results. The strategic bombers inflicted serious destruction, though not total, on the German defense. The benefit of the carpet bombing got offset by numerous short bomb loads dropped on friendly troops. The units making the attack suffered confusion and the loss of over 100 killed and nearly 500 wounded. Bradley’s penetration succeeded in breaking through but he swore off using strategic bombers ever again.

Successful Joint Operations - Fort Fisher

There have been notable examples of successful joint operations. During the Civil War the Confederates fortified the point of land at the entrance to the Cape Fear River. This fortification, Fort Fisher, had kept the vital port of Wilmington open to blockade runners. After an abortive attempt on Fort Fisher in December 1864, the Union organized a second attack in January.

Rear Adm. David Porter and Maj. Gen. Alfred Terry coordinated an amphibious landing north of the fort. The navy provided massive fire support against Confederate positions while Union troops came ashore on January 13. The ships shifted their fire to the fort as the army cut off the peninsula and made its approach. After a continual bombardment the army and a supporting force of marines assaulted the fort’s northern face. The troops penetrated the fort while communicating their progress with the navy. The ships kept shifting their fire ahead of the advance until the Confederates surrendered. Careful planning and communication produced a decisive Union victory against a formidable defensive position.

Naval Bombardment of Fort Fisher

Lessons

In sum, joint operations depend on each armed service understanding the resources, tactics and shortcomings of the others. The operational plan demands input from each service to involve joint assets to their fullest capability. A single unified commander should settle disputes and disagreements between services. During execution, all services must overcome systems incompatibilities to inter-communicate and keep the battle properly coordinated. When joint planning, communication and control come together the results can achieve the multiplicative effect Eisenhower described.

Actions on D-Day

Roosevelt at Utah Beach
BG Roosevelt and MG Barton at Utah Beach

Of the thousands of Allied soldiers who landed on D-Day, none stood up more than Brigadier General Theodore Roosevelt. The 4th Division’s beloved General Teddy landed with the first wave on Utah Beach. Once on land, he realized the division’s landing craft had dropped the initial wave in the wrong spot. His call to bring the other waves ashore in the same location spared the troops from confusion and disorder. He personally greeted each succeeding wave to point the way inland for each unit. Because of his hands-on leadership, the 4th Division adapted to the change in landing sites without trouble. One man made a huge difference in the success at Utah Beach.

The Army awarded Teddy Roosevelt the Medal of Honor for his courage and leadership on D-Day. It added to his collection of medals. He had a Distinguished Service Cross and Purple Heart from World War I and four Silver Stars. General Bradley even overcame his misgivings about Roosevelt and promoted him to division commander, though Roosevelt died before he could take command.

Casual Leadership Style

General Teddy Roosevelt
General Teddy in Normandy

Bradley had good reason to think twice about elevating General Teddy. He was the type of officer enlisted men loved and superiors despised. Courageous to the point of fearlessness, Roosevelt led by example. His landing with the first wave was no act of bravado. He could be found at the front in most tough situations. He could also be found drinking with the enlisted men after hours. His devil-may-care attitude about military civilities and formalities grated higher ranking generals. General Bradley had relieved him from a position with the 1st Infantry Division for numerous oversights on matters of discipline.

My father had a notable encounter with General Teddy at Utah Beach, when he noticed that Roosevelt was not wearing his helmet. It was typical behavior for the self-assured general. You can read about the incident in my book Battle Hardened.

Businessman, Soldier and Statesman

By the time he fought in Normandy, General Teddy had reached a point when he may not have cared a flip if his actions brought censure or a scolding from a superior officer. His reputation and legacy were beyond rebuke. He had already enjoyed surpassing success as a businessman and statesman. Coming out of Harvard, he earned a fortune on Wall Street. He volunteered to serve as a private in World War I but was commissioned, instead. He ended the war as a colonel then helped found the American Legion.

Theodore Roosevelt Statesman
Teddy Roosevelt while in office

Wherever he went, he earned the respect and affection of the people who depended on him. As an example, the people of Puerto Rico nicknamed him the “Hillbilly in the Governor’s Mansion” because of his embrace of their culture while serving as their governor. Filipinos called him “One Shot Teddy” in admiration of his hunting skills while Governor-General of the Philippines. For those who have the time, I suggest reading about his many accomplishments and political offices held.

Legacy

General Roosevelt died from a heart attack on July 12, 1944.  Stepping out from the shadow of an American giant, Teddy Roosevelt, Jr. (he was actually the III) made his own mark in the world and at Utah Beach. Well-loved and sorely missed, he deserves to be remembered.

Historians have spilled more ink about the Battle of Gettysburg than any other conflict in human history. Still, people often lose sight of the critical role artillery fire planning played in the attack against Cemetery Ridge.

Confederate Fire Support Plan

When General Lee decided to attack Cemetery Ridge on July 3, he fashioned a plan

Brig. Gen. Wm Pendleton
Confederate Artillery Chief, Brig. Gen. Wm Pendleton

that depended on a massed artillery preparation. He intended to have the artillery fire pave the way for Pickett’s, Pettigrew’s and Trimble’s infantry divisions. Yet, Lee’s plan fell short of its potential. Lee's Army had not developed the degree of centralized fire planning necessary to achieve his purpose. The army’s chief of artillery, Brigadier General William Pendleton, viewed his role as a logistics planner, not as a tactician. He only contributed to the fire support plan by tasking the batteries in Hill's and Ewell's Corps that faced the objective to join the bombardment. Responsibility for directing the artillery fire against Cemetery Ridge devolved upon Colonel Edward Porter Alexander who commanded the I Corps (Longstreet's) artillery reserve battalion. Alexander amassed enough guns to pound Cemetery Ridge. Eighty-four guns from I Corps, seventy-two guns from III Corps and another sixteen from II Corps would fire the preparation.

Col. Edward P. Alexander
I Corps Artillery Commander Col E. P. Alexander

The batteries deployed along Seminary Ridge that ran parallel to the objective on Cemetery Ridge. The guns had a broad sweep of the Union lines but the limited depth of the objective presented a challenge. The gunners needed precise range estimates and accurately timed fuses to strike their targets. Lee counted on the 172 guns to soften up the Union infantry and take out their supporting artillery. However, the Confederate fire support had one inescapable limitation. Lee had planned a frontal attack. The Confederate infantry had to pass through their own artillery batteries on the way to the objective. That meant the artillery could not suppress the Union guns during the infantry approach march and final assault.

Missed Opportunity

The Confederate fire support plan had another, needless, flaw. Neither Lee nor

Attack Against Cemetery Ridge
Confederate Attack Against Cemetery Ridge

Pendleton planned artillery fire to encompass the whole battlefield. More than 40 guns belonging to Ewell's II Corps stayed idle during the attack. Pendleton left them out of the battle because II Corps was not involved in the attack. This decision violated an important artillery precept to maximize the use of available fire support assets.

To make matters worse, the II Corps guns had the best position for suppressing the defenders on Cemetery Ridge. The Union defense resembled a fish-hook, anchored on Round Top in the south and Cemetery Hill in the north. The long dimension of the front ran north-south along Cemetery Ridge. The south-facing II Corps guns had a chance to rain devastating enfilade fire down the length of the objective. The gunners only had to align their guns with the ridge and not worry about the range. Their shells would land somewhere along the defensive front. Furthermore, these guns could keep firing throughout the infantry attack until the final push masked their fire.

Union Fire Support

MG Henry Hunt
Union Artillery Chief, Maj. Gen. Henry Hunt

In contrast, the Union chief of artillery, Major General Henry Hunt, supervised all the army’s guns. He even oversaw the allocation, positioning and targeting of the guns under the direct control of the corps commanders. Hunt arrayed his batteries from Little Round Top in the south to Cemetery Hill farther north. From these positions, Union artillery covered the valley separating the two armies with deadly interlocking fire. Hunt also trained his battery commanders to fire at a deliberate rate to conserve ammunition and preserve accuracy.

Artillery Battle

The effectiveness of the artillery fire on July 3, 1863 reflected the tactical expertise of the two artillery chiefs. The Confederates unleashed a concentrated and sustained bombardment but the massive preparation failed to blast a hole in the Union line. The gunners had difficulty setting the proper range on their guns. As a result, the shells mostly overshot the objective.

At first, the Union batteries returned fire, leading to an indecisive artillery duel. Union General Hunt intervened to stop the duel. He ordered his batteries to cease fire. He knew the upcoming infantry attack represented a greater threat and a more lucrative target for the Union’s remaining rounds. Across the battlefield, Colonel Alexander halted the Confederate preparation once ammunition ran low. This left the Confederate infantry to break the Union line on their own. A key piece of Lee’s battle plan had fallen short.

Artillery Fire at Gettysburg
Union Battery in Action

When the Confederate infantry divisions approached Cemetery Ridge, the Union guns inflicted appalling casualties with canister shot against the exposed infantry. Rather than stay put, one aggressive Union battery surged forward and flanked the Confederate formation. Their guns then shattered the attacking infantry with deadly enfilade fire. As the attack reached its decisive stage, the Union guns punished the Confederates with heavy losses.

To read a more detailed description of the assault on Cemetery Ridge, I invite you to read my previous publication, More Terrible Than Victory,

Conclusion

In sum, ineffective Confederate artillery fire planning squandered a chance to deliver a damaging blow to the Union position on Cemetery Ridge. This oversight allowed well-planned and well-managed Union artillery fire to cripple the assault.

When I was a battalion commander, I confessed a military truth to my troops. “I can’t win a battle. I carry a .45 cal. pistol—no way can I defeat an enemy force. It takes riflemen, tank crews, squad leaders, sometimes junior officers, to win a battle…But I can sure lose one.” I finished with a commitment. “If you follow orders and fight with vigor, I’ll do my part to follow sound tactical principles that will give you the chance to win.”

The relationship between troops and their commander depends on this implicit bond. When either party falls down on their promise, the results can be terrible.

When Troops Fail

Military history provides a few examples of troops failing to deliver victory despite

the clever and bold plans of their generals. General Grant caught Lee off-guard during the Overland Campaign of 1864.

Assault at Petersburg
Army of Potomac assaults Petersburg

He sent a large force south of the James River to attack a thin Confederate defensive line around Petersburg while Lee guarded the front north of the river. The Union troops, already depleted by heavy casualties at the Wilderness, Spotsylvania and Cold Harbor, mounted only a half-hearted assault against a small but determined Confederate force. Grant’s army squandered this opportunity to break the Confederate defense and had to spend another nine months investing Petersburg. At Kips Bay, New York in 1776, Washington had pre-positioned a patriot force where the British made an amphibious landing. The patriots barely fired a shot in the battle. Washington became apoplectic when his troops panicked and fled before the small British landing party.

Even in these situations, commanders do not escape responsibility for the poor performance of their men. In the above examples, Grant had allowed the fighting spirit of his command to dull through heavy losses and lack of confidence. Washington should not have expected the ill-trained and inexperienced militia unit to stand firm against a bayonet charge from British regulars.

When Generals Fail

The sadder and more common tragedy arises when brave, capable soldiers die needlessly through the errors and inattention of their commanders.

General Gerow
General Gerow

The 1944 fight on the Schnee Eifel portion of the Siegfried Line, discussed in my book Battle Hardened, demonstrates the effect of poor decision-making and faulty terrain analysis. The V Corps Commander, MG Leonard Gerow, channeled the 4th Infantry Division into a forlorn attack on the wet, wooded ridge that lacked roads to support a major advance. The division’s attack plan forced the 12th Infantry Regiment to fight along the narrow crest of the Schnee Eifel, a plan similar to climbing a fence by crawling over it lengthwise. The American infantrymen outfought the slapped-together German troops, from one pillbox to the next, in a series of localized shootouts. The narrow crest road, often interdicted by German artillery, constricted the Americans’ maneuver and supply operations. Instead of breaking through, the attack crawled, even though the GIs killed and captured the defenders they faced.

Poor Tactics

History provides several egregious examples of generals ignoring basic tactics.

In 1758, General James Abercrombie brought an overwhelming force against the French at Fort Carillon, now known as Ticonderoga. Abercrombie disregarded a commanding hill that he could have used to pummel the French flank with artillery. Instead, he left his guns in the rear and threw his infantry into a frontal attack against hasty French entrenchments.

Attack on Fort Carillon
British Troops Attack Fort Carillon

The French infantry swept the ground with musket fire from behind breastworks that could have been blown to pieces by artillery. The British, with the help of some colonial troops, pressed the attack but withered under French musket fire. When his first attack failed, Abercrombie ordered another, unsupported, frontal attack with the same result. The British suffered 2,500 casualties in the futile assaults. Abercrombie still had a huge advantage in strength but decided to withdraw. The rapid retreat stunned the French who could hardly believe they so easily defeated the massive British force.

Another British general, Thomas Wentworth, failed as miserably. He commanded a British and colonial American expedition that tried to capture Cartagena in 1741.

Cartagena Castle
Castle Walls at Cartagena

The British had to seize a stone castle that dominated the Caribbean town. Rather than batter down the fortress walls with artillery, Wentworth ordered several thousand infantrymen to assault the castle. The redcoats approached the fort only to discover that their ladders could not reach the top of the parapets. With no breach in the walls and no way to climb them, the attacking force stood helpless beneath the castle. Exposed to enemy fire, they suffered heavy losses. The attack accomplished nothing, except waste lives.

Conclusion

These examples illustrate the point I originally made. The troops are the ones who kill the enemy and break his will in battle. As stated in the U.S. Army’s leadership manual, “What they ask in return is competent leadership.” The general’s role is to give the soldiers the chance to achieve victory. He does that by giving them the resources they need and employing them in a tactically sound manner. Failing that, victory becomes unobtainable.